Meanwhile, back at the 13.7 blog...

...Professor Kauffman continues his march to the sea (where fish are, no doubt, right now engaged in employing their swim bladders as exaptations to be turned into hummingbird beaks). There are many things about his posts that rub me the wrong way, really rub me the wrong way, but a big one is the incomplete and hence misleading logical construct used to formulate his "no law" assertions.

Since he is, apparently, an accomplished scientist, I am forced to conclude that he is intentionally misleading his nonscientist readers. The crux of his deception is an incompletely formulated syllogism (paraphrasing): - since the natural laws we understand and accept tell us there is, in principle, no way to deterministically predict future events, there is "no law [sic]". Leaving aside for now the inspired creationist jiu-jitsu technique of enlisting scientific principles and findings as their own enemies, it is crucial to recognize the unstated initial proposition in this syllogism: "If we admit as natural law only those principles that make deterministic temporal predictions, and - since the natural laws ..." That is the only proposition that can lead off his logical construct to arrive at a valid "no law" conclusion. But that initial proposition is, not, not even remotely, the general scientific understanding of what we admit as natural law.

C'mon, Stu!!! You know as well as anyone that when Peebles "predicted" the cosmic microwave background it wasn't a temporal prediction that two guys named Penzias and Wilson would be cleaning pigeon droppings out of their radio telescope 40 miles away in a few months! It was a "phenomenal" prediction: under appropriate conditions, a very specific and precisely circumscribed phenomenon would be apparent. THAT's what scientists nearly always mean when they use the term "predict" and phenomenal prediction is nearly always the form of scientific law.

Professor Kauffman's conspicuous finessing of this initial proposition looks to those sufficiently versed in this science "magic" thing, as nothing more than sleight of hand employed to fool the rubes nonscientists. Reading his entries, I just can't shake the sense that instead of using his role in the 13.7 blog in an appropriate dialogue with nonscientists, he's intent on scoring cheap shots against Steven Weinberg, located conveniently off camera blog, and advancing a pet economic model, by deliberately misleading - browbeating, really - some blog readers to a gross and fundamental misunderstanding of the general structure of science.

And finally there's this: be very, very wary of scientists and others who are eager to (mis)apply some natural or physical law to address what are fundamentally social issues. This is, for instance, what gave us the marvels of eugenics, and boy-oh-boy do I viscerally distrust the general thrust of a scientist invoking the principles of quantum mechanics and the special theory of relativity in support of an economic paradigm. There is simply no mechanism, none, that would allow an understanding of the worldlines of events in the special theory of relativity or the superposition of quantum mechanical eigenfunctions to credibly inform an economic paradigm. If you resort to having these principles undergirding your economic model, to quote lolcats, "ur doin it rong". If Kauffman-economics grows legs, trust me, move your investment portfolio to mattress manufacturers. Or if Hank Paulson becomes CEO of Sealy-Posturepedic, maybe straight to mattresses.

Deconstructing the Liberty Belle

I wonder, I wonder … ? Could it be that NPR has a policy of letting willful stupidity speak for, and thereby hang itself? It’s an innovative and radical notion. And probably one that won’t work given the apparent willful stupidity of great swathes of the nation. After all, calling willful stupidity stupid falls on the stupidly deaf ears of the willfully stupid.

Now, remember that kerfuffle at NPR over the Mark Fiore “Learn to Speak Tea-Bag” cartoon a while back? They caught some heat over it, and as a supposedly unbiased national media outlet reporting in a time of intense political passions, it was definitely a very edgy thing to publish. But most of the group the cartoon was poking fun at couldn’t have been more deserving.

Well, quick on the heels of that dustup, NPR did a report on a charming piece of work who calls herself the “Liberty Belle”. Because of its timing, and at first glance, one might easily have taken the piece as a conciliatory gesture to those it had insulted.

But take a look at this Liberty Belle quote from the piece:

"I tried to boil down in essence what makes me so angry about it," Carender says. "And it was this idea that he and other people decide what the needs are in society. They get to decide. But in order to fund those things, they have to take from some people in order to give to the other people."

So here is Liberty Belles’s “boiled down” political manifesto: let us never again submit to evaluating the quality of ideas themselves; let us, instead, simply demand that our elected officials be free of ideas; freedom, after all, means never having to think; come my friends and let us declare freedom, sweet freedom from the tyranny of ideas!

Sweet Jeebus, that explains so much, including, the until now, mysterious (to me) appeal of Sarah Palin, she of the infamously and perfectly sanitized of any semblance of ideas, empty political rhetoric.

So look: we know NPR has limited time to report on Liberty Belle – they have to pick and choose what parts of her story they will publish. Could it be that NPR cleverly slipped this report, this cartoon more laughable and more disparaging, than Fiore’s, under the radar of the Tea Party movement, relying on 6th grade reading comprehension levels to defuse the otherwise inevitable invective from those it so clearly lampooned? So it might appear based on a comparison of the comments garnered on the two pieces.

And that report was quickly followed by an odd little piece on Andrew Breitbart, raising his profile to NPR listeners just as Breitbart’s albatross was so clearly settling in for an unpleasant, and one can only hope, long stay: a minion with an extended resume of right-wing and racist associations, ugly and possibly illegal political tricks, and, ultimately, a federal felony charge.

Unfortunately, my experience with those possessed of willful stupidity, and its apparently inexhaustible current supply, leaves me pessimisstic that such an approach will have any effect. Still, it provides some comic relief as gotterdammerung ensues. Thanks, NPR, for the few smiles you can provide as the flames consume us.

Executive Compensation

So much debate, so little time. Should the government regulate executive compensation? I'll ignore, for now, whether such regulation is realizable (for all kinds of reasons), consistent with the American vision, and popularly supported. Instead, I conducted a thought experiment to determine whether there would be ANY condition under which it would be appropriate to regulate executive compensation. The answer is unequivocally yes: if executive compensation so undermined, so endangered, so threatened the common good and/or the welfare of the nation that it was a clear and present danger, then it should be regulated just as any other danger would be (including economic concerns), e.g., sale of methamphetamines, child labor, disposal of radioactive waste, indentured servitude, export of weapons technology, etc.

If that is the case, then the real concern is not the size of executive compensation packages per se. (The flip side of Jesus' "the poor you will always have with you" is that the oligarchs you will also always have with you). What seems much more problematic is that compensation mechanisms may have been a proximate cause of the financial crisis and the "great recession," and indeed may be at the root of a great many other economic pressures that are not in the public interest. There is, in fact, a great deal of compelling evidence for this. Many compensation schemes we have heard about handsomely, obscenely, rewarded executives and others for precisely those actions and decisions that precipitated, is precipitating the ongoing disaster: short term metrics at the expense of long term prospects, extreme leveraging of positions, IBGYBG attitudes, hedging against one's own positions, abandoning prior obligations to employees and retirees, cronyism, cowing regulators and buying legislators, ignoring blatant conflicts of interest. If it walks like a clear and present danger and quacks like a clear and present danger...

Does a Bear ...

Ooh, ooh, what's it called, when you "complicate" a well known saying? Kind of the reverse of a euphemism, but not quite. One occurred to me as I was putting together the last post - and got me all agiggle:

Does a bear increase the overall entropy of the universe while converting energy from one form to another in the woods?

On second thought, it's too obvious - surely that saying or a close variant is already out there, right?

Update: circumlocution or periphrasis? Not quite - they don't seem to carry the intentional humorous connotation that is always an element in these sayings.

Update: Proposed T-shirt for physics students:
On the front: "Do I like physics?"
On the back: "Does a bear increase the overall entropy of the universe while converting energy from one form to another in the woods?"

Update: Proposed tee shirt for chemists, engineers, biologists, oh, hell, anybody:
On the front: "Do I like thermodynamics?"
On the back: "Does a bear increase the overall entropy of the universe while converting energy from one form to another in the woods?"

Testing the Emergence Hypothesis

In considering the hypothesis of emergent phenomena there is, from a science perspective, a need and a responsibility to test the hypothesis, and so a singularly important question to be answered: what are the distinctive observable characteristics that an emergent phenomenon would display compared to one that is reductive. As I have already pointed out in this blog, there is a perfectly lovely historical example of such an approach in Einstein’s development of the Special Theory of Relativity. As Einstein exemplified in that case, it is one of the responsibilities of a scientist advancing a novel hypothesis to identify how it may be tested.

Now I suspect that some with a weaker grasp of the principles and practice of science would propose a straightforward test of demonstrating that an emergent principle correctly predicts a phenomenon where reductive principles were incapable of making the prediction. But I think most practicing scientists would recognize that this is not a sufficient test of the emergence hypothesis. Reductive principles may still correctly characterize a complex phenomenon in spite of the fact that we do not have the capability to apply them to predict it. Let’s take an extreme case to make the point: our capability to “predict” phenomena with quantum field theory is based on an infinite perturbation expansion – that is, everything, literally everything you can actually “predict” with it, is intrinsically an approximation; and yet no emergence proponents, not a one, has ventured to claim that the magnetic dipole moment of the electron is an emergent phenomenon even though we know we do not have the capability to predict it exactly. (Some folks just seem to go all wobbly over agreement to one part in ten billion.) So, let’s recap: even if a hypothesized emergent principle correctly predicted a phenomenon that reductive principles couldn’t because of our capability to apply them, this is not, I repeat not, a sufficient test of the emergence hypothesis.

Because of the capability dilemma, we are forced to apply a weaker and admittedly much less satisfying test of reductive principles for complex phenomena: examining whether the phenomena are consistent with the reductive principles, that is, examining a complex phenomenon looking for evidence that it violates the reductive principles. (Giraffe composed of atoms from the periodic table of the elements – check. Giraffe accelerates at 9.8 m/s^2 when dropped – check. Giraffe increases overall entropy of the universe when converting energy from one form to another – check. Etc., etc., etc.) Of every test of this kind of which I am aware (save one) there has never been a single instance that provided even the remotest evidence of violation of reductive principles. (The one instance that I am genuinely puzzled by is “dark energy”, which, oddly, seems to draw little attention from emergence proponents. That dark energy is some creepy weird shit, man!) And so here is the kicker for the emergence proponents: If a phenomenon is correctly described by an emergence hypothesis and yet the phenomenon is still consistent with reductive principles, then Occam’s Razor strongly suggests, if not demands, that the emergence hypothesis be considered unnecessary.

So, a challenge to emergence proponents: clearly and unequivocally identify the distinctive observable characteristics that an emergent phenomenon would display compared to one that is reductive and in a way that satisfies Occam. If you cannot or will not do this then it suggests that you are not doing science.

Update: OK, for the purpose of the challenge, let’s say reductive phenomena are those that are solely the consequence of the standard model of particle physics + the general theory of relativity + any as yet undiscovered components of the universe consistent with these [Higgs boson, dark matter (? – see NPR 13.7 Blog post @Mgleiser: Dark Matter), dark energy(?!?)] + any underlying reductive structure that subsumes these. Yuk. Not so pretty. But that’s still part of the problem: a claim of emergence could appear to offer clarity simply in contrast to murkiness in parts of our reductive understanding.

I know someone is going to call foul on this because we don’t know what the undiscovered components are and what the underlying reductive structure is. But turnabout is fair play: it’s just as much of a foul for emergence proponents to exclude these, because there are a number of very strong indicators that they are there. Without a knowledge of the undiscovered components and understanding of the underlying reductive structure a claim that a phenomenon is emergent cannot genuinely be tested against a competing reductionist claim, and as I have argued, if a phenomenon can be understood in terms of both an emergent hypothesis and a reductive hypothesis, Occam’s razor says reductive wins.

The posts on the NPR 13.7 blog suggest a range of interpretations of what constitutes emergence. For the purpose of the challenge, let’s say emergence is behavior which is demonstrably not solely a consequence of reductive phenomena as defined above.

Update: I hadn't noticed before I wrote this, but in the comments to one of the NPR 13.7 blog posts (see @SAK42: Breaking the Galilean Spell), there is indeed some heady discussion of a possible (extraordinarily speculative)relationship between dark energy and emergence. Like I said, that dark energy ...

Dr. Kauffman’s Challenge

The discussion between Dr Kauffman and Dr. Goodenough seems to me to pivot on what is admissible as natural law. Dr. Kauffman, at least in my reading, appears to be advancing a position – really, a postulate – that in order for a principle to be admissible as a natural law all, phenomena associated with it must be deducible, e.g., for the principle of evolution to be admissible as a natural law one must, at least in principle, be able to deduce the giraffe – no deducible giraffe, “no law”. Dr. Goodenough, though, is advancing what in my experience is the much more common view within science, one that has proven at least empirically successful, that a principle is admissible as natural law if some phenomena are deducible from it and the remainder of the relevant phenomena are at least consistent with it, e.g., evolution is admissible as a natural law because from it one can deduce that some species that are subject to a rapid change in their environment will suffer extinction, and because giraffes are consistent with evolution.

Because of the more commonly accepted and empirically successful understanding, I would suggest that the onus is genuinely on Dr. Kauffman to do more than ask us to simply accept as given his postulate about what principles are admissible as natural law. Finally, I claim that this is not an insignificant point: we have an historical/scientific precedent that bears on this issue so, even though I deeply apologize for the apparently tangential nature and length of the following paragraph, please humor me.

In my experience most people very seriously misunderstand the true nature of what Einstein proposed in the special theory of relativity (STR). It is the first postulate, considered so unglamorous that it is rarely even mentioned in popular treatments of STR, that is perhaps its most profound insight. The first postulate of the STR was, in fact, a postulate about what principles are admissible as physical law: principles that take the same mathematical form in all inertial reference frames. At the time Einstein was developing the theory, there were two different mathematical representations of a single electrodynamic phenomenon, and which representation was used depended on the inertial reference frame in which the phenomenon occurred. Both representations worked flawlessly in experiments, but Einstein’s key insight, the reason he was unwilling to let this status quo stand, the burr under his saddle if you will, was what principles he considered admissible as physical law. He found that the two different representations could be shown to have the same mathematical form in any inertial reference frame provided one accepted the painfully counterintuitive assumption that the speed of electomagnetic radiation (light) is the same in all inertial reference frames. Thus, the second, sexier, postulate of the STR is, in some sense, simply a deduction following from the first postulate and the flawless experimental results associated with the two electrodynamic principles. From this point, Einstein went on to predict a number of consequences (e.g., E=mc^2) in terms of the specific observable (and, again, often painfully counterintuitive) behavior of physical systems that contrasted with the competing view. The point (yes I do have a point) is that tests of the special theory of relativity, such as experiments investigating the constancy of the speed of light and the equivalence of mass and energy were, in fact, tests of Einstein’s postulate about what principles are admissible as physical law against a competing understanding.

Dr. Kauffman’s challenge: Using the historical/scientific precedent of the STR model outlined above, if you are proposing a postulate about what principles are admissible as natural law, as it clearly seems to me you are, a postulate that contrasts with a commonly used and empirically successful understanding, I maintain that it is incumbent upon you as a practicing scientist to identify what the consequences of that postulate would be in terms of the specific observable behavior of natural systems that constrasts with the current understanding and, further, to propose a realizable test of the postulate. In conclusion it is, I suspect, pertinent to this dicussion, that a part of the reason I am so sensitive on this topic is that a fatal flaw of ID “theory” is its failure, its unwillingness really, to meet these minimal requirements.

Reduction, Kauffman, and (presumably this is where its going) God

Examining his biographical information it is clear that Dr. Kauffman is an extraordinarily accomplished and widely respected scientist. This suggests his insights are worth considering and, further, that I am well out of my element in critiquing them. And yet, “fools rush in …” There are a number of oddly questionable elements evident in the presentation of his argument in this (apparently) first in a series of essays. Here is a sample:

He at least insinuates that it is appropriate to lump together with no distinction, under the rubric of the aspects of a reductionist approach that he is criticizing, the efforts to identify “natural laws” associated with the Galilean inclined plane experiment, the “biosphere, human economy, human culture and our historicity”. For anyone with an even passing understanding of the utterly divergent methods and analyses applied to understanding the principles in these different areas, such a broad brush representation seems at least disingenuous, applied merely to bolster his position. Indeed, there is a very strong case to be made, of which Dr. Kauffman must surely be aware, that the extraordinary, unparalleled, stunning success of the reductionist approach in some of these areas – e.g., the physical sciences – is what has prompted its incorrect, incomplete and/or inappropriate application in others – e.g., historicity. The failure of the approach in one of these areas does not and should not be used wholesale to indict its application to another as he seems to be doing.

He resorts to a shameless straw man argument and even then his conclusion from it is patently and demonstrably wrong: the physicist who has no mechanism in the tools of the trade to “pick out pumping blood as of special interest” from the properties of the heart. The root of this determination by Dr. Kauffman seems to me to arise from an assumption that our straw physicist is only capable of a completely literal interpretation of an abbreviated three step version of the “scientific method” taught in 7th grade science class. But, of course, there is a vast literature that unequivocally demonstrates that the true practice of (even reductionist) science goes well beyond this limited and ineffective approach. Finally, I hope I really do not need to list the nearly endless litany of advances and insights the reductionist sciences have achieved that lie outside Dr. Kauffman’s tightly circumscribed interpretation of its practice.

Also, I have become extraordinarily skeptical of philosophical arguments that venture into, or worse, rely on appeal to quantum theory. There are, of course, many intriguing and puzzling consequences of quantum theory but I’ve just seen too many appeals to it that are gross misrepresentations and nothing more than quantum woo. In fact, I feel disposed to venture a new principle: Futzinfarb’s corollary to Godwin’s law is that “any general philosophical argument that degenerates into an appeal to quantum theory must be ignored”. I’ll have to give Dr. Kauffman a narrow pass on Futzinfarb’s corollary, as his assertions about the implications of quantum mechanics for evolution are probably fundamentally correct: that its principles (laws) preclude a reproducible time evolution of the universe. The fatally flawed conclusion drawn from this, though, is that since the principles of quantum theory cannot be applied to reproducibly predict the time evolution of various systems, that there is “no law.” This is little more than an a priori assumption, really a prejudice, about what kinds principles are admissible as natural laws. Dr. Kauffman appears simply unwilling to entertain even the possibility that we may inhabit a universe governed by specific reductive principles (laws) that have intrinsically irreproducible consequences. It’s just the icing on the cake that this position contrasts with his critique of an a priori reductionist approach to understanding.

There are other things that deeply bother me about this piece on which I will not elaborate here. Though he may have profound insights about the nature of the universe, this gravely flawed introduction is troubling has left me deeply skeptical.