Testing the Emergence Hypothesis

In considering the hypothesis of emergent phenomena there is, from a science perspective, a need and a responsibility to test the hypothesis, and so a singularly important question to be answered: what are the distinctive observable characteristics that an emergent phenomenon would display compared to one that is reductive. As I have already pointed out in this blog, there is a perfectly lovely historical example of such an approach in Einstein’s development of the Special Theory of Relativity. As Einstein exemplified in that case, it is one of the responsibilities of a scientist advancing a novel hypothesis to identify how it may be tested.

Now I suspect that some with a weaker grasp of the principles and practice of science would propose a straightforward test of demonstrating that an emergent principle correctly predicts a phenomenon where reductive principles were incapable of making the prediction. But I think most practicing scientists would recognize that this is not a sufficient test of the emergence hypothesis. Reductive principles may still correctly characterize a complex phenomenon in spite of the fact that we do not have the capability to apply them to predict it. Let’s take an extreme case to make the point: our capability to “predict” phenomena with quantum field theory is based on an infinite perturbation expansion – that is, everything, literally everything you can actually “predict” with it, is intrinsically an approximation; and yet no emergence proponents, not a one, has ventured to claim that the magnetic dipole moment of the electron is an emergent phenomenon even though we know we do not have the capability to predict it exactly. (Some folks just seem to go all wobbly over agreement to one part in ten billion.) So, let’s recap: even if a hypothesized emergent principle correctly predicted a phenomenon that reductive principles couldn’t because of our capability to apply them, this is not, I repeat not, a sufficient test of the emergence hypothesis.

Because of the capability dilemma, we are forced to apply a weaker and admittedly much less satisfying test of reductive principles for complex phenomena: examining whether the phenomena are consistent with the reductive principles, that is, examining a complex phenomenon looking for evidence that it violates the reductive principles. (Giraffe composed of atoms from the periodic table of the elements – check. Giraffe accelerates at 9.8 m/s^2 when dropped – check. Giraffe increases overall entropy of the universe when converting energy from one form to another – check. Etc., etc., etc.) Of every test of this kind of which I am aware (save one) there has never been a single instance that provided even the remotest evidence of violation of reductive principles. (The one instance that I am genuinely puzzled by is “dark energy”, which, oddly, seems to draw little attention from emergence proponents. That dark energy is some creepy weird shit, man!) And so here is the kicker for the emergence proponents: If a phenomenon is correctly described by an emergence hypothesis and yet the phenomenon is still consistent with reductive principles, then Occam’s Razor strongly suggests, if not demands, that the emergence hypothesis be considered unnecessary.

So, a challenge to emergence proponents: clearly and unequivocally identify the distinctive observable characteristics that an emergent phenomenon would display compared to one that is reductive and in a way that satisfies Occam. If you cannot or will not do this then it suggests that you are not doing science.

Update: OK, for the purpose of the challenge, let’s say reductive phenomena are those that are solely the consequence of the standard model of particle physics + the general theory of relativity + any as yet undiscovered components of the universe consistent with these [Higgs boson, dark matter (? – see NPR 13.7 Blog post @Mgleiser: Dark Matter), dark energy(?!?)] + any underlying reductive structure that subsumes these. Yuk. Not so pretty. But that’s still part of the problem: a claim of emergence could appear to offer clarity simply in contrast to murkiness in parts of our reductive understanding.

I know someone is going to call foul on this because we don’t know what the undiscovered components are and what the underlying reductive structure is. But turnabout is fair play: it’s just as much of a foul for emergence proponents to exclude these, because there are a number of very strong indicators that they are there. Without a knowledge of the undiscovered components and understanding of the underlying reductive structure a claim that a phenomenon is emergent cannot genuinely be tested against a competing reductionist claim, and as I have argued, if a phenomenon can be understood in terms of both an emergent hypothesis and a reductive hypothesis, Occam’s razor says reductive wins.

The posts on the NPR 13.7 blog suggest a range of interpretations of what constitutes emergence. For the purpose of the challenge, let’s say emergence is behavior which is demonstrably not solely a consequence of reductive phenomena as defined above.

Update: I hadn't noticed before I wrote this, but in the comments to one of the NPR 13.7 blog posts (see @SAK42: Breaking the Galilean Spell), there is indeed some heady discussion of a possible (extraordinarily speculative)relationship between dark energy and emergence. Like I said, that dark energy ...

Reduction, Kauffman, and (presumably this is where its going) God

Examining his biographical information it is clear that Dr. Kauffman is an extraordinarily accomplished and widely respected scientist. This suggests his insights are worth considering and, further, that I am well out of my element in critiquing them. And yet, “fools rush in …” There are a number of oddly questionable elements evident in the presentation of his argument in this (apparently) first in a series of essays. Here is a sample:

He at least insinuates that it is appropriate to lump together with no distinction, under the rubric of the aspects of a reductionist approach that he is criticizing, the efforts to identify “natural laws” associated with the Galilean inclined plane experiment, the “biosphere, human economy, human culture and our historicity”. For anyone with an even passing understanding of the utterly divergent methods and analyses applied to understanding the principles in these different areas, such a broad brush representation seems at least disingenuous, applied merely to bolster his position. Indeed, there is a very strong case to be made, of which Dr. Kauffman must surely be aware, that the extraordinary, unparalleled, stunning success of the reductionist approach in some of these areas – e.g., the physical sciences – is what has prompted its incorrect, incomplete and/or inappropriate application in others – e.g., historicity. The failure of the approach in one of these areas does not and should not be used wholesale to indict its application to another as he seems to be doing.

He resorts to a shameless straw man argument and even then his conclusion from it is patently and demonstrably wrong: the physicist who has no mechanism in the tools of the trade to “pick out pumping blood as of special interest” from the properties of the heart. The root of this determination by Dr. Kauffman seems to me to arise from an assumption that our straw physicist is only capable of a completely literal interpretation of an abbreviated three step version of the “scientific method” taught in 7th grade science class. But, of course, there is a vast literature that unequivocally demonstrates that the true practice of (even reductionist) science goes well beyond this limited and ineffective approach. Finally, I hope I really do not need to list the nearly endless litany of advances and insights the reductionist sciences have achieved that lie outside Dr. Kauffman’s tightly circumscribed interpretation of its practice.

Also, I have become extraordinarily skeptical of philosophical arguments that venture into, or worse, rely on appeal to quantum theory. There are, of course, many intriguing and puzzling consequences of quantum theory but I’ve just seen too many appeals to it that are gross misrepresentations and nothing more than quantum woo. In fact, I feel disposed to venture a new principle: Futzinfarb’s corollary to Godwin’s law is that “any general philosophical argument that degenerates into an appeal to quantum theory must be ignored”. I’ll have to give Dr. Kauffman a narrow pass on Futzinfarb’s corollary, as his assertions about the implications of quantum mechanics for evolution are probably fundamentally correct: that its principles (laws) preclude a reproducible time evolution of the universe. The fatally flawed conclusion drawn from this, though, is that since the principles of quantum theory cannot be applied to reproducibly predict the time evolution of various systems, that there is “no law.” This is little more than an a priori assumption, really a prejudice, about what kinds principles are admissible as natural laws. Dr. Kauffman appears simply unwilling to entertain even the possibility that we may inhabit a universe governed by specific reductive principles (laws) that have intrinsically irreproducible consequences. It’s just the icing on the cake that this position contrasts with his critique of an a priori reductionist approach to understanding.

There are other things that deeply bother me about this piece on which I will not elaborate here. Though he may have profound insights about the nature of the universe, this gravely flawed introduction is troubling has left me deeply skeptical.