Dr. Kauffman’s Challenge

The discussion between Dr Kauffman and Dr. Goodenough seems to me to pivot on what is admissible as natural law. Dr. Kauffman, at least in my reading, appears to be advancing a position – really, a postulate – that in order for a principle to be admissible as a natural law all, phenomena associated with it must be deducible, e.g., for the principle of evolution to be admissible as a natural law one must, at least in principle, be able to deduce the giraffe – no deducible giraffe, “no law”. Dr. Goodenough, though, is advancing what in my experience is the much more common view within science, one that has proven at least empirically successful, that a principle is admissible as natural law if some phenomena are deducible from it and the remainder of the relevant phenomena are at least consistent with it, e.g., evolution is admissible as a natural law because from it one can deduce that some species that are subject to a rapid change in their environment will suffer extinction, and because giraffes are consistent with evolution.

Because of the more commonly accepted and empirically successful understanding, I would suggest that the onus is genuinely on Dr. Kauffman to do more than ask us to simply accept as given his postulate about what principles are admissible as natural law. Finally, I claim that this is not an insignificant point: we have an historical/scientific precedent that bears on this issue so, even though I deeply apologize for the apparently tangential nature and length of the following paragraph, please humor me.

In my experience most people very seriously misunderstand the true nature of what Einstein proposed in the special theory of relativity (STR). It is the first postulate, considered so unglamorous that it is rarely even mentioned in popular treatments of STR, that is perhaps its most profound insight. The first postulate of the STR was, in fact, a postulate about what principles are admissible as physical law: principles that take the same mathematical form in all inertial reference frames. At the time Einstein was developing the theory, there were two different mathematical representations of a single electrodynamic phenomenon, and which representation was used depended on the inertial reference frame in which the phenomenon occurred. Both representations worked flawlessly in experiments, but Einstein’s key insight, the reason he was unwilling to let this status quo stand, the burr under his saddle if you will, was what principles he considered admissible as physical law. He found that the two different representations could be shown to have the same mathematical form in any inertial reference frame provided one accepted the painfully counterintuitive assumption that the speed of electomagnetic radiation (light) is the same in all inertial reference frames. Thus, the second, sexier, postulate of the STR is, in some sense, simply a deduction following from the first postulate and the flawless experimental results associated with the two electrodynamic principles. From this point, Einstein went on to predict a number of consequences (e.g., E=mc^2) in terms of the specific observable (and, again, often painfully counterintuitive) behavior of physical systems that contrasted with the competing view. The point (yes I do have a point) is that tests of the special theory of relativity, such as experiments investigating the constancy of the speed of light and the equivalence of mass and energy were, in fact, tests of Einstein’s postulate about what principles are admissible as physical law against a competing understanding.

Dr. Kauffman’s challenge: Using the historical/scientific precedent of the STR model outlined above, if you are proposing a postulate about what principles are admissible as natural law, as it clearly seems to me you are, a postulate that contrasts with a commonly used and empirically successful understanding, I maintain that it is incumbent upon you as a practicing scientist to identify what the consequences of that postulate would be in terms of the specific observable behavior of natural systems that constrasts with the current understanding and, further, to propose a realizable test of the postulate. In conclusion it is, I suspect, pertinent to this dicussion, that a part of the reason I am so sensitive on this topic is that a fatal flaw of ID “theory” is its failure, its unwillingness really, to meet these minimal requirements.